Evolutionary game theory. (Lecture 11) презентация

Outline Auctions Common value auctions All-pay auctions Review of seminar 2 Revision slides

Слайд 1LECTURE 11


Слайд 2Outline
Auctions
Common value auctions
All-pay auctions
Review of seminar 2
Revision slides


Слайд 3Structure
Economic decision problem
Model
Analysis
Theory




Classify, choose representation
to model, sequential, repeated
etc.
Select tools to

identify the equilibrium
NE, pure, mixed, SPE

Formulate theory that predicts, explains

Perform data collection and
testing to develop theory


Слайд 4Lecture 1-2
Classification
Simultaneous games, 2 players
Representation
Concept
Process
Lesson
Normal form (payoff table)
Pure NE
Cooperation
NE= likely outcome
NE

vs. optimal outcome
Cournot

Iterative elimination
Best response


Слайд 5Lecture 3
Classification
Simultaneous games, 2 players
Representation
Concept
Process
Lesson
Normal form (payoff table)
Mixed NE
Randomness
Indifference
Solve π(a)=π (b)


Слайд 6Lecture 4-5
Classification
Sequential
Representation
Concept
Process
Lesson
Extensive form (game tree)
SPE
Coordination
Order matters
Strategic moves
Backward induction


Слайд 7Lecture 6
Classification
Repeated games (vs one-shot games)
Representation
Concept
Process
Lesson
Normal form
Trigger strategies
Cooperation
Importance of r
TFT
Cournot and

repetition

Backward induction


Слайд 8Lecture 7
Classification
Evolutionary games
Representation
Concept
Process
Lesson
Normal form
ESS
Justification for NE
Some NE are not ESS
Solve

π(a)=π (b)

Слайд 9Lecture 8-9
Classification
Asymmetric information
Representation
Concept
Process
Lesson
Diverse
Information manipulation
Cheap talk may or may not work
Importance

of credibility ? costly signaling

Signaling, screening, mechanism design


Слайд 10Lecture 10-11
Classification
Auctions
Representation
Concept
Process
Lesson
Bid scale
Winning bid
Revenue equivalence
Winner’s curse
Optimal bid


Слайд 11Exam

Section A: 5 compulsory questions, at most 3 "mathematical/analytical" questions. (10

marks each)
Section B: choose 1 long essay style question out of 2. (50 marks)

Слайд 12Past paper (2014-15)
6. In games of cooperation, explain how the repetition of

play may affect the possibilities of cooperation compared with one-shot games. Illustrate your answer with an example.
7. Explain the purpose and the mechanism of signaling in games with incomplete information. Illustrate your answer with an example.


Слайд 13Section A
1 conceptual question:
e.g. explain the meaning of mixed strategies

in evolutionary game theory...
e.g. explain what the guessing game tells us about players’ rationality...
1 definition question: 3 definitions.
e.g: A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, Subgame perfect equilibrium, The Winner’s curse.

Слайд 14Section A
3 exercises + explain.
Seminars
Find the NE (sequential, simultaneous games,

repeated etc.)
Bargaining games, cooperation games etc.
Find the NE is games of Cournot and Stackelberg.
Find the ESS. Are the NE evolutionary stable?
Explain...


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