Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policies at the Crossroad. Is Ukraine a part of the new European Security Architecture? презентация

part of the new European Security Architecture?

Dr. Tetyana Malyarenko

Research design
Domestic scene for foreign and security affairs; key pressures and risk factors, associated with fragility of the Ukrainian State;
Ukraine’s foreign policy on three main directions (vectors), inc.
U.S.-Ukraine relations, EU-Ukraine relations, and Russia-Ukraine relations;
Ukraine’s security policy;
Is Ukraine a part of the new European Security Architecture?

and security policies (public opinion polls, January 2009)

Global financial crisis (36% polled);
☻ The Presidential elections in the USA (22%);
Conflict in Georgia (16%);
The Presidential elections in Russia (8%)

Ukraine’s national security risks and concerns, the Ukraine-NATO Joint Working Group, 2008)

Foreign policy State Program “Main directions of Ukraine’s
foreign policy” (1993);
Security policy The Strategy of National Security of Ukraine”
(1997), (2007)
General line is to combine integration into the West with
cooperation with Russia, inc. projects in the military industry.
Ukraine’s strategy is clear; implementation is less evident

describes a range of phenomena associated with state weakness and failure, including state collapse, loss of territorial control, low administrative capacity, political instability, neo-patrimonial politics, conflict, and repressive polities (The World Bank, OSCE)

State failure covers a wider range of civil conflicts, political crises, and massive human-rights violations that are typically associated with state breakdown” (the CIA, the USA)

State failure is a gradual process and that states engulfed in it fall into four broad categories: weak, failing, failed and collapsed states

Weak, failing, failed and collapsed states—the most common adjectives used in this context—were considered, quite correctly, as sources of insecurity and instability beyond their own boundaries, creating more or less complex humanitarian emergencies

Bank), The Failed States Index (The Fund for Peace), etc.

Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia
Asia: Lebanon, Tajikistan
Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Failed States
Africa: Angola, Burundi, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan
Asia: Afghanistan, Iraq, Nauru, Solomon Islands
Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Failing States
Africa: Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe
Asia: Indonesia, Iraq, North Korea
Americas: Colombia, Venezuela
Europe: Albania, Moldova
Weak States
Africa: Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria
Asia: Burma, Cambodia, Fiji, Georgia, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Yemen
Americas: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Paraguay, Venezuela
Europe: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine
Fragmented States
Africa: Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan
Asia: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka
Americas: Colombia
Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, (Kosovo)

States Index)

Africa: Cote d'Ivoire (1); Dem. Rep. of the Congo (2); Sudan (3); Somalia (5) ; Sierra Leone (1); Chad (7); Liberia (9); Rwanda (12); Zimbabwe (15); Guinea (16); Burundi (18); Central African Republic (20); Kenya (25); Uganda (27); Ethiopia (30)

Americas: Haiti (10); Colombia (14); Dominican Republic (19); Venezuela (21)

Asia: Iraq (4); Yemen (8); Afghanistan (11); North Korea (13); Bangladesh (17); Burma/Myanmar (23);
Uzbekistan (24); Bhutan (26); Laos (28); Syria (29)

Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina (22);

where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. The most important functions of the state for poverty reduction are territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves” (UK’s Department of International Development)

political instability, misbalanced
vulnerable economy, socio-
demographic issues, poverty,
sharp confrontation between elite
groups, ineffective and bloated
State apparatus, dysfunctional
state-level strategic management
mechanisms and decision-making
methods that are opaque,
detached, politicised, and
uncoordinated

its economy; real GDP decreased by 59,2% (1991-1999);
Among post-soviet states Ukraine, along with Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan has minimal real GDP compared to 1991 (e.g. in 2007 real GDP of Ukraine is 75% of its GDP in 1991).
Ukraine’s economy depends heavily on exports (46% of GDP). At the same time Ukraine also depends on imports of energy, especially Russian natural gas, to meet some 85% of its annual energy requirements
New economic crisis. GDP will decrease 5-7% in 2009

“Ukraine is in pre-default situation and has already lost its chance to reform economy and industry” – experts say.

51.7 million persons. At the beginning of 1993, it reached 52.3 million persons. Over the course of the years 1993-2008, the population dropped by 5.3 million persons, from 52.2 million persons to 46.9 million.
The causes of the decline are: a reduction in the birth rate, an increase in the death rate, caused by the unsatisfactory state of the health; low quality of the health care system, and an excess of the level of emigration.

only in 2000; at that time, 27.8 percent of the population (13.7 million persons) was considered to belong to the category of the impoverished, and 14.2 percent (almost 7 million persons), to the category of the destitute.
Over the past ten years, the human development index has been consistently low: Ukraine occupies the 91st place among UN member states in 2008. Thus there are grounds for predicting that poverty will be a persistent and chronic problem

freedom, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly;
Deaths in custody under suspicious circumstances;
Violent hazing of conscripts;
Government monitoring of private communications and movements of individuals without judicial oversight,
Anti-semitic acts;
Violence and discrimination against children and women;
Trafficking in persons;
Frequent harassment of minorities

Partnership (1994);
Agreement on establishment of strategic relationship (1996);
U.S. support for Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO (2006);
Ukraine was selected as an eligible state to receive assistance from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (2006);
U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership (December 2008)

Main areas of cooperation (priorities)
Defence and security cooperation;
Economic, trade and energy cooperation;
Strengthening of democracy and rule of law;
Cultural exchange

framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, our goal is to gain agreement on a structured plan to increase interoperability and coordination of capabilities between NATO and Ukraine…
…to strengthen Ukraine’s candidacy for NATO membership” (U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, Section II)

Framework Documents for NATO’s Partnership for Peace (1994)
The Code of Conduct on Military and Political Aspects of Security (1994)
The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO (1997)
NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC)
NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and Annual Target Plans since 2003
April 2005 NATO Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine’s membership aspirations and related reforms
Main areas of Ukraine-NATO cooperation now are:
Developing civil emergency planning;
Disaster response capabilities;
Security sector reform;
Countering terrorism;
Countering organized crime

Ukraine and NATO - history of unrequited love?

next week, how would you vote? % of those voted

or Instability? (interviews with subject matter experts)

Center, Center of Social Research Sofia)

Department of State, U.S. Security Council, CSIS)

capacity of Ukraine’s gas transit infrastructure;
The US – EU – Ukraine trilateral dialogue on energy security;
Support for direct contract negotiations between Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
Main factors/recent events:
Russia bought all volume of gas, which Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan
might export on Western directions for 20 years
Gas Exporting Countries Forum, Russia, 2008;
Decision of the ICJ from February 3, 2009 : Ukraine lost about 80%
of the Black Sea continental shelf and economic zone in favor of
Romania; Ukraine will bring a case against Russia to the ICJ;

Azerbaijan and Moldova

Initially established as regional geo-economical project (transit of oil, energetic security, free trade zone and even peace-keeping operations);
Main challenges for this organization now are: (a) loss of urgency; (b) changes in the Black Sea security architecture; (c) absence of clear rules on the energetic market of the EU; (d) no common position towards frozen ethnic conflicts

and Trade Cooperation, 2007

Ukraine’s export to: Russia (23,7%, increased 36,5% to 2006), Turkey (7,2%), Italy (4,3%), Poland (3,4%), Germany (2,7%), the USA (1,3%);
Ukraine’s import from: Russia (23,6%, increased 56,5% to 2006), Germany (8,3%), Turkmenistan (6,3%), China (6,3%), Poland (5,1%), the USA (0,1%)
Direct foreign investments to Ukraine: Cyprus (22,7%), Germany (18,1%), the Netherlands (8,6%), Austria (6,8%), UK (6,2%), Russia (5,1%), France (4%), the USA (3,4%)

"Geopolitical pivots are the states whose importance is derived not from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from the consequences of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behavior of geostrategic players…
Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be supported by their fellow Islamic states to the south”..
Zbigniew Brzezinski The Grand Chessboard

state of Russia-
Ukraine relations is more
conflicted now:
Russia lost the role of key player in Ukrainian domestic politics;
Main tensions: trade wars; energy security; NATO; unsettled disputes in maritime borders, legal status of the Crimea; Sevastopol and the Russian Black Sea Fleet

Main agreements and policy documents, which create framework for EU-Ukraine relations, are as follows:
EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1998), negotiations about advanced agreement have been carried out;
Joint EU-Ukraine Action Plan (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008);
Ukraine is included in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), designed to draw several countries closer to the EU and promote democratic reforms;
Agreement with the EU, allowing Ukraine to participate in EU crisis management operations (civilian and military crisis management operations, 2005).

it is!
It is simply too big not to be.
The main question, though it, is it part of the problem or the solution?
All my argument would point to Ukraine being a potentially major problem, precisely because it’s state institutions are so weak and the country therefore rather fragile.
So at this stage, it’s less a question of being pro-Russian or pro-Western, but rather to have a clear vision of its place in the new European security architecture and the capacity to implement this vision.

establish itself fully as a functioning state and remains weakened by low state capacity, and constant political infighting; core institutions of the state mutually paralyze each other. All in the context of serious domestic and external challenges and threats;
Ukraine has not been able to establish a clear vision of its foreign and security policy.
There is no consensus over Ukraine’s general direction in foreign policy. Implementation of relatively uncontroversial foreign policy objectives (EU relations) is impaired while any steps to make progress on the really controversial ones (NATO/US relations) further contributes to institutional problems.
As a result, Ukraine is likely to be one of the major liabilities in the new European security architecture.

The tribes found themselves constantly at reckless war with one another until they finally called out for guidance. They said to themselves, "Let us seek a prince who may rule over us and judge us accordingly to the law."
They henceforth went to the land of the Rus and said, "Our land is great and rich, but there is no order in it. Come rule and reign over us." (Roesdahl, p. 287). A Rus chieftain named Rurik came to the region and set up a kingdom in Novgorod in the time around 860 AD. The new kingdom thrived, and just a short twenty years later, a successor of Rurik conquered Kiev, a city over 600 miles south of Novgorod. The once jumbled region quickly became unified and seeds of a new empire had been created.

"Our land is great and rich, but there is no order in it. Come rule and reign over us."