Слайд 3
Leonard Nimoy’s “In Search Of…” Featured Triangle in Season
1 1976
Слайд 4
Supernatural Explanations
—Leftover technology from the lost continent of Atlantis;
Bimini Road near Bimini in Bahamas.
—UFOs & Aliens (Steven Spielberg) ends Close Encounters with the revelation that Flight 19 was abducted by the mothership.
Слайд 9
Story begins in 1952 Fate Magazine
“Sea Mystery at Our
Back Door”
Слайд 10
Charles Berlitz & Richard Winer 1974 Books Fueled the
Flames
Слайд 12
Flight 19 U.S. Navy TBM Avengers
December 5, 1945, 5
planes, 14 men Leader said: “We are entering white water, nothing seems right. We don’t know where we are, the water is green, no white.”
Слайд 13
The Unexplained ≠ Inexplicable
Mysterious ≠ Supernatural
Слайд 14
1. Depart Ft. Laud.
2. Drop bombs at Hen and Chickens shoals.
3. Proceed on new heading 346° for 73 nautical miles.
4. Fly on third heading 241° for 120 naut miles 5. Return to Ft. Laud. 6. Exact pos. unknown 7. Radio triangulation establishes flight's approx. position.
8. PBM-5 takes off.
9. PBM-5 explodes
10. The Florida Keys, where Taylor thought he was.
Слайд 15
500-page Navy board of investigation report:
—Taylor had mistakenly believed that the
small islands he passed over were the Florida Keys, so his flight was over the Gulf of Mexico and heading northeast would take them to Florida.
—It was determined that Taylor had passed over the Bahamas as scheduled, and he did in fact lead his flight to the northeast over the Atlantic.
—Some subordinate officers did likely know their approximate position as indicated by radio transmissions stating that flying west would result in reaching the mainland.
Слайд 16
500-page Navy board of investigation report:
—Taylor, although an excellent combat pilot
and officer with the Navy, had a tendency to "fly by the seat of his pants", getting lost several times in the process. Twice during such times he had to ditch his plane in the Pacific and be rescued.
—It wasn't Taylor's fault because the compasses stopped working.
—This report was subsequently amended "cause unknown" by the Navy after Taylor's mother contended that the Navy was unfairly blaming her son for the loss of five aircraft and 14 men when the Navy had neither the bodies nor the airplanes as.
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Natural Explanations
—Compass Variations
—Hurricanes
—Gulf Stream anomalies
—Methane Eruptions
—Rogue Waves
—Deliberate Acts
of Destruction
—Human Error
Слайд 18
Larry Kusche’s 1976
Bermuda Triangle Mystery: Solved
Revealed inaccuracies and
inconsistencies between Berlitz's accounts and statements from eyewitnesses, participants, and others involved in the initial incidents. Noted cases where pertinent information unreported
Слайд 19
Kusche’s Explanation
—The number of ships and aircraft reported missing
in the area was not significantly greater, proportionally speaking, than in any other part of the ocean.
—In an area frequented by tropical storms, the number of disappearances that did occur were neither disproportionate, unlikely, nor mysterious; furthermore, Berlitz and other writers would often fail to mention such storms.
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Kusche’s Explanation
—The numbers themselves were exaggerated by sloppy research.
A boat's disappearance, for example, would be reported, but its eventual (if belated) return to port may not have been.
—Some disappearances had, in fact, never happened. One plane crash was said to have taken place in 1937 off Daytona Beach FL, in front of hundreds of witnesses; a check of the local papers revealed nothing.
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Kusche & the Burden of Proof
"Say I claim that
a parrot has been kidnapped to teach aliens human language and I challenge you to prove that is not true. You can even use Einstein's Theory of Relativity if you like. There is simply no way to prove such a claim untrue. The burden of proof should be on the people who make these statements, to show where they got their information from, to see if their conclusions and interpretations are valid, and if they have left anything out."
Слайд 22
Baseline Rate Explanation
The Bermuda Triangle is one of the
most heavily traveled shipping lanes in the world: —Ships cross it daily for ports in the Americas, Europe, and the Caribbean Islands
—Cruise ships, pleasure craft regularly go back and forth between Florida and the islands.
—Also a heavily flown route for commercial and private aircraft heading towards Florida, the Caribbean, and South America from points north.
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Lloyd’s of London, who keeps detailed records of all
disasters, noted in a UK Channel 4 TV special that there was nothing unusual about the “triangular” area beyond chance expectation based on the baseline rate for amount of traffic in a given area.
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U.S. Coast Guard Investigation
Concluded that the number of supposed
disappearances is relatively insignificant considering the number of ships and aircraft that pass through the “triangle.” Noted the 1972 explosion and sinking of the tanker SS V.A. Fogg in the Gulf of Mexico, Coast Guard photographed the wreck and recovered several bodies, in contrast with claim that all the bodies had vanished, with the exception of the captain, who was found sitting in his cabin at his desk, clutching a coffee cup.
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The Devil’s Triangle varies by author
No “operational definition” of area
Слайд 26
Illusion of Small Numbers
A small number of data points
Слайд 28
Illusion of Large Numbers
Black Swan effects in complex systems
Million
to one odds happen 300 x/day
Слайд 29Humans trying to emulate random sequences will almost never place more
than four heads (or tails) in a row.
Слайд 30In a true random generation, the probability of at least one
string of 5 or more identical outcomes is 0.999 and for a sequence of 6 it is 0.96!
Слайд 31It is easy to spot which is human generated: it is
the one that looks least random!
Слайд 32The Birthday Probability Game
The odds of
getting 2
people with
the same
birthday is
better than
50%
with
only 23
people.
Слайд 33
“Regression to the Mean”
Height (2 tall parents: for every
4 children, 3 will be shorter for every one taller)
2. I.Q. (2 smart parents: for every 4 children, 3 will be dumber for every one smarter)
3. Hollywood films (producers and directors get fired after one bad film, even though their films under production go on to success)
4. Sports Illustrated Cover Curse (to get on the cover an athlete has to have a statistically extraordinary game or season, which is unlikely to happen again)
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The Monty Hall Problem
Let’s Make a Deal!
3 Doors: 1 car, 2
goats
Monty knows what’s behind all 3 doors
Monty will not reveal what’s behind your door
Monty can only show you a goat
You choose Door #1
Monty shows you what’s behind door #2: Goat
Door #1: ? Door #2: Goat Door #3: ?
Do you want to keep your choice or switch?
Слайд 35
The Monty Hall Problem
At the start: 1/3rd chance of picking the
car and a 2/3rds chance of picking a goat.
Switching doors is bad only if you 1st chose the car, which happens only 1/3rd of the time.
Switching doors is good if you 1st chose a goat, which happens 2/3rds of the time.
Thus, the probability of winning by switching is 2/3rds, or double the odds of not switching.
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10 Doors: 1 car, 9 goats
Monty knows what’s behind all 10
doors
You choose Door #1
Monty reveals door #s 2-9: Goats
Door #1: ?
Door #2: Goat Door #3: Goat Door #4: Goat
Door #5: Goat Door #6: Goat Door #7: Goat
Door #8: Goat Door #9: Goat
Door #10: ?
Do you want to keep your choice or switch?
Слайд 37
Folk Innumeracy & Death Dreams
5 dreams/day = 1,825 dreams/year
1/10 remembered dreams
= 182.5/year
295 million Americans = 53.8 billion remembered dreams/year
Each of us knows about 150 people fairly well
Network grid of 44.3 billion personal relationships
Annual U.S. death rate = .008 = 2.6 million/year
Inevitable that some of those 53.8 billion remembered dreams will be about some of these 2.6 million deaths among the 295 million Americans and their 44.3 billion relationships.
It would be a miracle, in fact, if some death premonition dreams did not come true
Слайд 39
The greatest money manager of our time
What do ant colonies, novels
and river systems have to do with making money? Ask Bill Miller, the man who's topped the market 15 years running.
Fortune managing editor Andy Serwer reports.
November 15 2006: 4:07 PM EST
(Fortune Magazine) -- Have you heard the story about the money managers and the three bears? It was a gorgeous afternoon last June on a ranch outside Cody, Wyo. Legendary investor Bill Miller was riding horseback with Chris Davis of Davis Funds and Michael Larson, who runs Cascade, Bill Gates' investment company.
The three had been out about an hour when dead ahead of them, no more than 100 yards off, appeared three grizzly bears. Larson gently pulled up on his reins and quietly began to back his horse away. But Miller had other ideas. "Let's see how close we can get," he said, and edged ahead. Larson stayed back. "I don't know what Bill was thinking," Larson said later. "I guess he figures he's on a horse and can ride faster than Chris Davis."
Слайд 40“Odds of beating S&P for 13 years straight are 1 in
149,012”
“Odds of beating S&P the 14th year are 1 in 372,529”
“Greatest fund feat in past 40 years”
Слайд 41The Scientific View:
Assume random 1 in 2 chance
of beating
S&P per fund manager,
each year…
Bill Miller
beating the S&P 15 years in a row starting in 1991 = 1 in 32,768…
Probability of
Слайд 43Probability of Someone among all the managers beating the S&P 15
or more years in a row starting any year in the last 40 years = ???... 3/4 or .75
Assume random 1 in 2 chance
of beating S&P per fund manager,
each year…
Слайд 44
Expected 15-year run finally occurs
Bill Miller lucky beneficiary!!
The greatest money
manager of our time
Headline should NOT be:
But rather…
Слайд 45
Hindsight Bias
Monday Morning Quarterbacking
—9/11 conspiracy theories
—Stock market causal explanations
—Authorized
autobiography
Слайд 46
Confirmation Bias
The tendency to seek & find confirming evidence
for one’s beliefs, and to ignore disconfirming evidence
Слайд 49
Reading Michael Drosnin’s response to Michael Shermer’s column on the Bible
“code” and its ability to accurately predict the future, I could not help but laugh. I have been a writer and illustrator of comic books for the past 30 years, and in that time I have “predicted” the future so many times in my work my colleagues have actually taken to referring to it as “the Byrne Curse”.
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It began in the late 1970s. While working on a Spider-Man
series titled “Marvel Team-Up” I did a story about a blackout in New York. There was a blackout the month the issue went on sale (six months after I drew it.) While working on “Uncanny X-Men” I hit Japan with a major earthquake, and again the real thing happened the month the issue hit the stands.
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Now, those things are fairly easy to “predict,” but consider these:
When working on the relaunch of Superman, for DC Comics, I had the Man of Steel fly to the rescue when disaster beset the NASA space shuttle. The Challenger tragedy happened almost immediately thereafter, with time, fortunately, for the issue in question to be redrawn, substituting a “space plane” for the shuttle.
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Most recent, and chilling, came when I was writing and drawing
“Wonder Woman”, and did a story in which the title character was killed, as a prelude to her becoming a goddess.
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The cover for that issue was done as a newspaper front
page, with the headline “Princess Diana Dies”. (Diana is Wonder Woman’s real name). That issue went on sale on a Thursday. The following Saturday. . . I don't have to tell you, do I?
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My ability as a prognisticator, like Drosnin's, would seem assured—provided, of
course, we reference only the above, and skip over the hundreds of other comic books I have produced which featured all manner of catastrophes, large and small, which did not come to pass.
—John Byrne
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The Wisdom of the Crowd
Averaging Errors Over Large Numbers
Слайд 56
Change Blindness
We look for meaning and miss details
Слайд 57
Change Blindness
We look for meaning and miss details
Слайд 58
Cognitive Dissonance
“What we obtain too cheap we esteem too
lightly”
—Thomas Paine
Discovered by Leon Festinger in 1954 in his investigation of a UFO cult.
Слайд 59
PROPHESY FROM PLANET CLARION
CALL TO CITY: FLEE THAT FLOOD.
IT'LL
SWAMP US ON DEC 21 [1954]
OUTER SPACE TELLS SUBURBANITE
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Festinger and had infiltrated the Seekers, a small Chicago-area cult whose
members thought they were communicating with aliens—including "Sananda," who they believed was the astral incarnation of Jesus Christ. The group was led by a Dianetics devotee who transcribed the interstellar messages through automatic writing. Through her, the aliens had given the precise date of an Earth-rending cataclysm: December 21, 1954. Some of her followers quit their jobs and sold their property, expecting to be rescued by a flying saucer when the continent split asunder and a new sea swallowed much of the United States. The disciples even went so far as to remove brassieres and rip zippers out of their trousers—the metal, they believed, would pose a danger on the spacecraft.
Слайд 61
Cognitive dissonance, or the uncomfortable tension that comes from holding two
conflicting thoughts at the same time.
December 21, 1954 Marion Keech’s prediction for the world to end when aliens arrive
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Leon Festinger: “Suppose an individual believes something with his whole heart;
suppose further that he has a commitment to this belief, that he has taken irrevocable actions because of it; finally, suppose that he is presented with evidence, unequivocal and undeniable evidence, that his belief is wrong: what will happen? The individual will frequently emerge, not only unshaken, but even more convinced of the truth of his beliefs than ever before. Indeed, he may even show a new fervor about convincing and converting other people to his view.”
Слайд 63
What to do when Prophecy Fails:
The date was miscalculated
The date was
a loose prediction, not a specific prophecy
The date was a warning, not a prophecy
God changed his mind
The prediction was just a test of the members’ faith
The prophecy was fulfilled physically, but not as expected
The prophecy was fulfilled…spiritually
Слайд 64
Self Justification Bias
The self-justification bias is the tendency to
rationalize decisions after the fact to convince ourselves that what we did was the best thing we could have done.
Or as I like to say, smart people believe weird things because they are better at rationalizing their beliefs that they hold for non-smart reasons.
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“I acknowledge that mistakes were made here. I accept
that responsibility.”
—U.S. Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales
“Mistakes were quite possibly made by the administrations in which I served.” —Kissinger on Vietnam, Cambodia, and S.A.
“If, in hindsight, we also discover that mistakes may have been made…I am deeply sorry.” —NY Catholic Cardinal Edward Egan
Слайд 66
Confirmation Bias
The tendency to seek & find confirming evidence
for one’s beliefs, and to ignore disconfirming evidence
Слайд 67
Social psychologist Geoffrey Cohen quantified this effect in a
study in which he discovered that Democrats are more accepting of a welfare program if they believe it was proposed by a fellow Democrat, even when, in fact, the proposal comes from a Republican and is quite restrictive. Predictably, Cohen found the same effect for Republicans, who were far more likely to approve of a generous welfare program if they thought it was proposed by a fellow Republican.
Слайд 68
“You get in the system and you become very
cynical. People are lying to you all over the place. Then you develop a theory of the crime, and it leads to what we call tunnel vision. Years later overwhelming evidence comes out that the guy was innocent. And you’re sitting there thinking, ‘Wait a minute. Either this overwhelming evidence is wrong or I was wrong—and I couldn’t have been wrong because I’m a good guy.’ That’s a psychological phenomenon I have seen over and over.” —NW U. Law Prof Rob Warden
Слайд 69
Self-Serving Bias
In one College Entrance Examination Board survey of
829,000 high school seniors, 60 percent put themselves in the top 10 percent in “ability to get along with others,” while 0 percent (not one!) rated themselves below average.
1997 U.S. News and World Report study on who Americans believe are most likely to go to heaven: 52 percent said Bill Clinton, 60 percent thought Princess Diana, 65 percent chose Michael Jordan, 79 percent selected Mother Teresa, and, at 87 percent, the person most likely to go to heaven was the survey taker!
Слайд 70
Attribution Bias
The tendency to attribute different causes for our
own beliefs and actions than that of others.
Слайд 71
Situational attribution bias: We identify the cause of someone’s belief or
behavior in the environment
“Her success is a result of luck, circumstance, and having connections”.
Dispositional attribution bias: We identify the cause of our own belief or behavior in our disposition
“I am successful because I’m hard working, intelligent, and creative” .
Слайд 72
Intellectual attribution bias: We consider our own beliefs as being rationally
motivated.
Emotional attribution bias: We see the beliefs of others as being emotionally driven.
“I am for gun control because statistics show that crime decreases when gun ownership decreases”
“He is for gun control because he is a bleeding-heart liberal who needs to identify with the victim” or “he is against gun control because he’s a heartless conservative who needs to feel emboldened by a weapon”
Слайд 73
Lisa Farwell and Bernard Weiner discovered in their study on the
attribution bias in political attitudes, with conservatives justifying their beliefs with rational arguments but accusing political liberals of being “bleeding hearts”; liberals, in turn, offered intellectual justifications for their positions, while accusing conservatives of being “heartless.”
Farwell, Lisa and Bernard Weiner. 2000. “Bleeding Hearts and the Heartless: Popular Perceptions of Liberal and Conservative Ideologies.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 845-52.
Слайд 74
Why People Believe in God
Parental Beliefs
Слайд 75
Why People Believe in God
Education
Слайд 77
Why People Believe in God
Conflict/Harmony with Parents
Слайд 78
Why People Believe in God
Why People Think Others Believe in God
Слайд 79
Availability Fallacy
The tendency to assign probabilities of potential outcomes
based on examples that are immediately available to us, especially those which are vivid, unusual, or emotionally charged, which are then generalized into conclusions upon which choices are based
Слайд 80
Availability Fallacy
In the run up to the 1976 United
States Presidential election an experiment was conducted in which one group of subjects were asked to “imagine Gerald Ford winning the upcoming election,” while another group of subjects were asked to “imagine Jimmy Carter winning the upcoming election.”
Слайд 81
When subsequently asked to estimate the probably of each
of the candidates winning, those who were asked to imagine Ford winning estimated his chances as much higher than those who were asked to imagine Carter winning, who, in turn, gave their guy a much higher probability of victory. This availability heuristic shows how we assign probabilities of potential outcomes based on examples that are immediately available, which are generalized into conclusions upon which choices are based.
Слайд 82
Conjunction Fallacy
Imagine that you are looking to hire someone
for your company and you are considering for employment the following candidate:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
Which is more likely? 1. Linda is a bank teller.
2. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
Слайд 83
Bias Blind Spot
The tendency to recognize the power of
cognitive biases in other people but to be blind to their influence upon our own beliefs.
Princeton University psychologist Emily Pronin and her colleagues, subjects were randomly assigned high or low scores on a “social intelligence” test. Those given the high marks rated the test fairer and more useful than those receiving low marks. When asked if it was possible that they had been influenced by the score on the test, subjects responded that other participants had been far more biased than they were.
Слайд 84
Bias Blind Spot
Even when subjects admit to having such
a bias as being a member of a partisan group, says Pronin, this “is apt to be accompanied by the insistence that, in their own case, this status…has been uniquely enlightening—indeed, that it is the lack of such enlightenment that is making those on the other side of the issue take their misguided position.”
Слайд 85
Sunk Cost Fallacy
—The tendency to believe in something because
of the cost sunk into that belief.
—Vietnam, Iraq war, Stocks, Business
—Failing businesses & relationships
Слайд 86
Sunk Cost Fallacy
Leo Tolstoy: “I know that most men,
including those at ease with problems of the greatest complexity, can seldom accept even the simplest and most obvious truth if it be such as would oblige them to admit the falsity of conclusions which they have delighted in explaining to colleagues, which they have proudly taught to others, and which they have woven, thread by thread, into the fabric of their lives.”
Слайд 87
Endowment Effect
Owners of an item value it roughly twice
as much as potential buyers of the same item.
Слайд 88
Endowment Effect Experiment
Subjects given a coffee mug worth $6
Asked the lowest price they would take: $5.25.
Other subjects asked how much they would pay for the same mug: $2.75
Слайд 89
Loss Aversion
Losses hurt twice as much as gains feel
good
Слайд 90
Imagine that I gave you $100 and a choice
between (A) a guaranteed gain of $50 and (B) a coin flip in which heads gets you another $100 and tails gets you nothing. Do you want A or B?
Now imagine that I gave you $200 and a choice between (A) a guaranteed loss of $50 and (B) a coin flip in which heads guarantees you lose $100 and tails you lose nothing. Do you want A or B?
The final outcome for both options A and B in both scenarios is the same so rationally it does not matter which option you choose, so people should choose both equally.
Слайд 91
Most people choose A in the first scenario (a
sure gain of $50) and B in the second scenario (avoiding the sure loss of $50).
Even though there is no difference between having $100 and a sure or potential gain of $50, and having $200 and a sure or potential loss of $50, emotionally there is a difference. That emotion is called loss aversion, or risk aversion.
On average most people will reject the prospect of a 50/50 probability of gaining or losing money unless the amount to be gained is at least double the amount to be lost, because losses hurt twice as much as gains feel good.
Слайд 92
Loss Aversion in the Brain
Neuroeconomists using fMRI brain scans found areas
in the brain that light up (or down) during profits and losses that are rich in dopamine receptors, a neurotransmitter associated with motivation and reward. As the potential for losses increased they found decreasing activity in these reward-sensitive areas.
Слайд 93
Loss Aversion in Monkeys
Capuchin monkeys were given 12 tokens that they
were allowed to trade with the experimenters for either apple slices or grapes.
In one trial, the monkeys were given the opportunity to trade tokens with one experimenter for grapes and with another experimenter for apple slices. One monkey, for example, traded 7 tokens for grapes and 5 tokens for apple slices. A baseline like this was established for each monkey so that the scientists knew each monkey’s preferences.
Слайд 94
Trial #2: monkeys were given additional tokens to trade for food,
only to discover that the price of one of the food items had doubled.
According to the law of supply and demand, the monkeys should now purchase more of the relatively cheap food and less of the relatively expensive food, and that is precisely what they did.
In another trial in which the experimental conditions were manipulated in such a way that the monkeys had a choice of a 50% chance of a gain or a 50% chance of a loss, the monkeys were twice as averse to the loss as they were motivated by the gain.
Слайд 95
Question: Why Didn’t Risk Aversion Prevent the Financial Meltdown?
Answer: Risk Signals
were removed in both the public & private spheres.
Слайд 96
Risk Aversion & the Financial Meltdown
Federal Reserve Intervention into the price
of $$$
Interest Rate manipulation
Price & Wage Controls
Bailouts (signals that losses will be recovered by someone else, thereby removing loss aversion)
Moral Hazards (government insulates investors and corporations from risk, thereby removing risk aversion): GM, Crystler, AIG
Example: Community Reinvestment Act, 1977, to prevent “redlining” against minorities, led to government intervention into the housing market
Слайд 97
How Financial Institutions
Lost Risk Aversion
(“Toxic”) Mortgage Backed Securities
Credit Default Swaps
Derivatives
& Credit Derivatives
Lending agencies passing paper down the line:
A mortgage is given by a loan officer.
A thousand mortgages are bundled and sold as a mortgage-backed security.
A thousand mortgage-back securities packaged and sold as a collateral debt obligation (CDO).
A thousand CDOs packaged, sold, and secured with credit default swaps.
Слайд 98
September 30, 1999 New York Times: “Fannie Mae Eases Credit To
Aid Mortgage Lending”
Fannie Mae began a program that spring to encourage banks “to extend home mortgages to individuals whose credit is generally not good enough to qualify for conventional loans.”
Why?
Слайд 99
September 30, 1999 New York Times: “Fannie Mae, the nation’s biggest
underwriter of home mortgages, has been under increasing pressure from the Clinton Administration to expand mortgage loans among low and moderate income people and felt pressure from stock holders to maintain its phenomenal growth in profits.”
July, 1999, HUD forced Fannie & Freddie to increase portfolio of loans to lower and moderate-income borrowers from 44% to 50% by 2001.
Слайд 100
There’s nothing wrong with taking higher risks, whether under political or
profit pressure, as long as you adjust for it by charging more. The higher price acts as a risk signal to keep the market in balance.
Under the new program, higher-risk people with lower incomes, negligible savings, and poorer credit ratings could now qualify for a mortgage that was only one point above a conventional 30-year fixed rate mortgage (and that added point was dropped after 2 years of steady payments).
In other words, the normal risk signal sent to high risk consumers—you can have the loan but it’s going to cost you a lot more—was removed. Lower the risk signal and you lower risk aversion.
Слайд 101
Entrepreneurial Error
Investors buy the wrong stock
Businessmen produce the wrong products
Consumers over-spend, especially during holidays.
Drivers have accidents.
Ships sink.
Builders don’t meet deadlines.
Economists make false predictions.
Entrepreneurs cut corners, deceive customers, & embezzle funds.
Economic failure, stupidity, & incompetence are too common.
Слайд 102
Entrepreneurial Error
“To make mistakes in pursuing one’s ends is a widespread
human weakness.” —Ludwig von Mises
“As a rule only some businessmen suffer losses at any one time; the bulk either break even or earn profits.”
—Murray Rothbard
Слайд 103
Entrepreneurial Error
Leads to Business Cycles
Слайд 109
Solutions to the Financial Crisis
1. Allow the market to determine risk
signals
2. Markets, not the Fed, must determine price of $$
3. Losses must be linked directly to those who make financial decisions, from lenders to CEOs
4. No more bailouts! No one is “too big to fail”
5. No more: “In profits we’re capitalists, in losses we’re socialists”
6. Evolution & Economics: “Extinction is the rule, survival the exception.”
7. Economies must be allowed to flourish from the bottom up, & cannot be controlled from top down
8. Free Trade w/well defined & enforced rules
Слайд 111
How to See the World Anew
1. Think out of the box,
change perspectives, look for the gorilla
2. Look for new patterns, be playful, relaxed, and see the bigger picture
3. Be curious, ask why, examine the unexpected
3. Look for disconfirmatory evidence and alternative explanations
4. Seek peer review, constructive criticism, and feedback
5. Be willing to change your mind, to say “I don’t know” and “I could be wrong”
Слайд 117
Law of Small Numbers
Law of Large Numbers
Regression to
the Mean
Hindsight Bias
Framing Effects
Anchoring Fallacy
Loss Aversion
Sunk Cost Fallacy
Endowment Effect