Слайд 1Competition and Firm Strategy
Chuck Eesley
Morgenthaler Faculty Fellow
Assistant Professor
Stanford University
Management Science &
Engineering
School of Engineering
cee@stanford.edu
How to be a Monopoly 101
(building a company Warren Buffett would invest in)
Слайд 3Excellent businesses
What are some examples?
What makes them excellent?
In small groups of
3
5-10 minutes
Слайд 4What is a competitive advantage?
Слайд 9Competitive advantage = barriers to entry
With no barriers, must constantly run
firm as efficiently as possible
Слайд 10Competitive advantage
Definition: Something a firm can do that its rivals cannot.
Слайд 12Examples
Moutai vs. Tsingdao
Sina Weibo ? QQ ? Tencent
Ebay ? Alibaba
Shanghai Jahwa
vs. P&G\
Baidu ? Google
Whirlpool ? Qingdao Haier
Hanergy ? Traditional Energy - solar overcapacity
Guangxi Wuzhou Zhongheng Group vs. Pharma firms
YY vs. Google Hangouts
BYD?
Apple vs. Xiaomi
Brand vs. low-cost
Слайд 13Traditional View
Porter’s Five Forces
Long-term, durable competitive advantage
Manufacturing-based
Efficiency-based investments in manufacturing
Use of
capital – quote about profits being all the inventory/equipment vs. cash
Слайд 18Barriers to Entry/Growth
In markets without barriers, competition is intense!
Loss of traditional
sources of competitive advantage
Low cost labor
Protected markets
Government ties (anti-corruption campaign)
Слайд 19Sources of Competitive Advantage
Monopoly
Government ties (关系)
Cost advantage (Chinese manufacturing)
Regulations (Energy, Pharma)
Capital
intensive industry
Brand (Coca-Cola)
Network effects (Microsoft Office)
2-sided networks (Ebay, Facebook, Google, Media companies)
Слайд 20It is better to buy a wonderful business at a fair
price than a fair business at a wonderful price.
Warren Buffett
Слайд 21Categories
Demand competitive advantages
Unequal access to customers
Customer captivity
Search costs
Switching costs
Government support/protection
Cost (supply)
competitive advantages
Superior technology
Patents
Larger scale + declining marginal costs
Special access to information
Слайд 22Competition with Barriers to Entry?
With barriers to entry is life necessarily
all good?
Airlines
Automobiles
Banking
Avoiding competition that leaves every participant worse off is an especially enlightened choice – one that deserves to be called “strategic”.
Слайд 23Sketch of current macro-economic situation
Export/import deficits
Chinese over-capacity in manufacturing
US over-spending
Слайд 25New View
Series of short-term competitive advantages
Could be based on technology, but
not necessary
All strategy is local
Focus on Niche-markets – difficult to dominate global markets
Services-based, retail – focus on one geography
Wal-mart, Grocery stores, Universities
Manufacturing-based – focus on one niche product
Cannot dominate global automobiles in general
Intel – only chips
Nokia ? Apple ? Xiaomi?
Слайд 26Sources of competition
Domestic competitors, same industry
Former employees
Foreign low-cost competition (Africa)
Neighboring industry
competitors (TV/Radio)
New industry competitors
AT&T ? VOIP
Hotels ? Airbnb
Taxi ? Uber
Newspapers/TV ?Social Media)
Слайд 27Adjacent markets
Perilous to chase growth across borders
Dominate a set of discrete,
contiguous markets, expand only at the edges
Example of over-expansion ? Wal-Mart
Слайд 29How to get from here to there? (Tactics)
New market, same product
New
product, same market
Not a bad idea to date before marriage
Internal venturing (intra-preneurship)
Corporate Venture Capital
Joint Venture
Alliances
Investments in VC
Acquisitions
Слайд 30Circle of Competence
Know the boundaries and push them slowly
Industry
Diversification typically hurts
performance
Geography
Wal-mart, Verizon
Product
Apple, Microsoft, Intel
Mode of entrepreneurship/investment
If you have no experience with joint ventures or acquisitions, tread slowly with the first few
Слайд 31Internal Venturing
Great option when it works
Fighting a war on two fronts
sometimes
Слайд 32Corporate Venture Capital
Tough to get right and maintain
Слайд 33The Intangible Element
Strategy must be executed faithfully
This is why company culture
is so important
It is also difficult to change
Слайд 34Trust
The highest form that civilization can reach is a seamless web
of deserved trust – not much procedure, just totally reliable people correctly trusting one another… In your own life what you want is a seamless web of deserved trust. And if your proposed marriage contract has forty-seven pages, I suggest you not enter.”
Charlie Munger (Wesco Financial annual meeting, 2008)
Слайд 35Joint Venture
Reduces risk on both sides
Has been common for Chinese firms
with foreign companies (experience)
Step below an acquisition
Step above an alliance
Other party must bring something to the table
Rotating leadership works best
Слайд 36Alliances
Both parties have to bring something to the table
Another form of
dating before marriage
Слайд 37VC investments
Great way to learn about technologies/new markets
Beware: most VC firms
lose money (only the top 25% make money)
Can be a better idea than CVC
More independence
Might not wind up strategically related
Слайд 38Acquisitions
Goal – but tricky to do well
Only buy businesses whose value
you understand.
Buy businesses for less than they are worth.
Слайд 39Acquisitions
On average acquisitions destroy value for the acquiring firm
Beware:
Paying a premium
for “synergy”
Thrill of an acquisition/enhanced size
Paying in stock - "buyer sells part of itself to acquire seller"
More successful when:
Within circle of competence - Related industry
Experience with acquisitions
Business can raise prices easily and has a high return on capital
Target is either left alone or thoughtfully integrated
Слайд 40Conglomerates that work?
(1) Berkshire would be a diffuse conglomerate, averse only
to activities about which it could not make useful predictions.
(2) Its top company would do almost all business through separately incorporated subsidiaries whose CEOs would operate with very extreme autonomy.
(3) There would be almost nothing at conglomerate headquarters except a tiny office suite containing a Chairman, a CFO, and a few assistants who mostly helped the CFO with auditing, internal control, etc.
(4) Berkshire subsidiaries would always prominently include casualty insurers. Those insurers as a group would be expected to produce, in due course, dependable underwriting gains while also producing substantial “float” (from unpaid insurance liabilities) for investment.
(5) There would be no significant system-wide personnel system, stock option system, other incentive system, retirement system, or the like, because the subsidiaries would have their own systems, often different.
(6) Berkshire’s Chairman would reserve only a few activities for himself.
Then names several activities that Buffett does, mostly limited to managing investments, a lot of reading, and CEO replacements when necessary.
Слайд 41(7) New subsidiaries would usually be bought with cash, not newly
issued stock.
(8) Berkshire would not pay dividends so long as more than one dollar of market value for shareholders was being created by each dollar of retained earnings.
(9) In buying a new subsidiary, Berkshire would seek to pay a fair price for a good business that the Chairman could pretty well understand. Berkshire would also want a good CEO in place, one expected to remain for a long time and to manage well without need for help from headquarters.
(10) In choosing CEOs of subsidiaries, Berkshire would try to secure trustworthiness, skill, energy, and love for the business and circumstances the CEO was in.
(11) As an important matter of preferred conduct, Berkshire would almost never sell a subsidiary.
(12) Berkshire would almost never transfer a subsidiary’s CEO to another unrelated subsidiary.
(13) Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire on account of mere age.
(14) Berkshire would have little debt outstanding as it tried to maintain (i) virtually perfect creditworthiness under all conditions and (ii) easy availability of cash and credit for deployment in times presenting unusual opportunities.
(15) Berkshire would always be user-friendly to a prospective seller of a large business. An offer of such a business would get prompt attention. No one but the Chairman and one or two others at Berkshire would ever know about the offer if it did not lead to a transaction. And they would never tell outsiders about it.
Слайд 42Metrics
Margins
Turnover
Growth
Earnings growth
Return on capital
Management
ROE
Intrinsic value
Слайд 43Example: MOOCs and Universities
MOOCs as potential disruptive technology
What is the source
of the competitive advantage/moat in academia?
Is this threatened by MOOCs?
Christensen vs. Porter
Debate: Disrupt your own business or use tech to extend your competitive advantage?
Слайд 44Beware the Institutional Imperative
Analogous to Newton’s first law of motion
An institution
(e.g. a business) will resist any change to its current direction
Innovation is a dirty term in organizations
Behavior of peer companies will be mindlessly imitated
Corporate projects will materialize to soak up time (just as work expands to fill available time)
Слайд 45What to avoid
Institutional Imperative
Purportedly strategic moves
Acquiring companies
Entering other markets
Lowering price (by
reducing margins)
Pet projects (risky R&D)
First mover advantage
Everyone else is doing it…
Слайд 46Framework
What business is worth being in?
Monopoly, not commodity (what is the
source of the moat?)
What price is worth paying to be in that business?
Слайд 47Claim:
China would be better off copying Berkshire Hathaway than copying Silicon
Valley.
Charlie Munger (Warran Buffett’s business partner)
Is this true?
Слайд 50Outline – what we covered
Excellent businesses
Strategy
Moats
Circle of Competence
Practical tactics
Beware the Institutional
Imperative
Values
Слайд 51Wisdom acquisition is a moral duty.
- Charlie Munger, USC commencement speech,
2007
Слайд 52Competition and Firm Strategy
Chuck Eesley
Morgenthaler Faculty Fellow
Assistant Professor
Stanford University
Management Science &
Engineering
School of Engineering
cee@stanford.edu
How to be a Monopoly 101
(building a company Warren Buffett would invest in)